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Abstract 
 This research studies the impact of capital controls on the stock market. 
More specifically, the effects on the stock market of Greece, Cyprus and Russia were 
studied, before, during and after the imposition of capital controls in each country. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the behavior of the markets, the reaction of 
the investors before and after the announcement of the capital controls. The research 
was based on the returns and volume of transactions, approximately one year before 
(except for Cyprus where the time range was shorter) and one year after the 
introduction of the capital controls, regarding the general indices and the indices of 
high capitalization companies in the countries under review. 
From the analysis, it was found that, the average values of the returns and the 
volume for both indexes of Greece, slightly increased compared to the period before 
and after the capital controls. An expected result of the analysis, was the increased 
volatility after the capital controls for the returns and mainly for the volume for both 
indexes, ASE & FTSE. This means that the market was more unstable and less 
predictable after the capital controls, even though the mean values were the same for 
the returns and the volume, between the two periods. An unexpected result was the 
increase in volume of transactions after the capital controls, a key difference 
compared to the countries under analysis.  In Cyprus and Russia, the results are 
similar regarding the returns, for both indices. Nevertheless, volume dropped 
significantly after the capital controls, indicating that investors became more 
conservative. All three countries experienced higher volatility in returns (except for 
FTSE_CY) and volume, compared to the period before the capital controls. The 
findings indicate, finally, a co-movement between the returns and the volume of 
transactions for the countries under analysis.   
 
Keywords: capital controls, returns, volume, Greece, Cyprus, Russia 
 
Obasis George, 
31/03/2018 
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I. Introduction 
i. Definitions and Basic Concepts 
The concept of capital controls involves measures to achieve the regulation of 
the capital flows to and from an economy. Previously, the use of capital controls was 
a key tool for macroeconomic policy. Following the economic liberalization in the 
1970s and 1980s, the imposition of capital controls was considered outdated and their 
imposition now takes place only in times of crisis and, most importantly, to minimize 
damage to the financial system (Economist, 2015). The possibilities of pursuing an 
independent monetary policy that is consistent with policies to achieve price stability, 
product growth and external sector development are more limited, and the use of 
capital controls constitutes a measure (Cordero & Montecino, 2010). 
Events such as sudden changes in investor responses, external events, and 
government decisions have a major impact on the volatility of the short-term capital 
flows. A sharp increase in capital outflows may cause an imbalance of payments 
crisis, leading to a currency crisis that can also be combined with a financial crisis. A 
general distinction of capital controls measures, which also have a different impact on 
the economy, are the controls based on regulating market flows (by introducing tax-
related or minimum reserve requirements) and controls based on in administrative or 
quantitative measures that entail more severe restrictions and limits (Cordero & 
Montecino, 2010). Also, the imposition of the capital controls can be distinguished in 
the measures taken in terms of capital inflows into a country and in capital outflows 
from a country, two different areas with different effects on the economy and 
macroeconomic developments (Magud, et al., 2011). 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is a theory stipulating that the markets are 
constantly and fully up to date or, alternatively, current securities prices fully reflect 
all relevant and available information in an effective way and are constantly changing 
to incorporate any new information that may arise (Ross, et al., 2010). 
In practice, it has been proven that markets are not efficient, and decision-
making is not always a rational process or a one-dimensional process, leading people 
to make mistakes in their decisions and actions. Thus, the need for a new approach 
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has emerged that will be able to interpret the behavior of financial markets and 
explain the market phenomena that the traditional economic theory has failed to 
interpret.  
Behavioral finance attempts to explain and link the gap between theory and 
action as has been found that psychology influences considerably the investment 
decisions of individuals, leaving behind the financial models and the rational criteria 
for making a decision. In fact, behavioral finance deals with the study of the influence 
of social perceptions, emotional prejudices and psychological factors at both 
individual and collective level, and how these can cause turmoil in the capital market, 
the prices, the returns and resources. Especially in the extreme economic phenomena 
like today, human psychology has a negative impact on the economy, causing 
individuals operating in the financial markets to make a multitude of mistakes. These 
mistakes may come from false impressions and incomplete information and may lead 
to the dissolution of the entire financial system (Pompian, 2006). 
The main purpose of behavioral finance is to create a link between all the 
components of the social sciences (psychology, sociology) and financial sciences to 
present the intellectual and emotional mistakes of investors that do not allow them to 
make clear-headed decisions (Thaler, 2005). 
 
ii. Research Objectives 
The main objective of the present study is to present and examine the impact 
of capital controls on the Greek, Cypriot and Russian economies by integrating 
theoretical and empirical data, researching the pattern of stock markets reaction to the 
announcement of the implementation of capital controls in the under-analysis 
countries. The capital control measures are expected to have a negative impact on the 
stock market.  
The study’s theoretical part consists of the literature background regarding the 
capital controls’ framework, the aspects of the efficient market hypothesis and 
behavioral finance, while the empirical results aim to examine if the capital controls 
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affect the efficiency of the markets, by analyzing the markets’ determinants, return 
and volume, after the announcement of the capital restrictions.  
Specifically, the concept of capital controls is presented, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages they present and the measures taken in the economies 
under consideration. Moreover, the concept and conditions of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis are determined, the role of Behavioral Finance is presented in an attempt 
to explain the phenomena that go beyond the limits of rational decisions and involve 
psychological and sociological implications. Furthermore, we present indicative 
examples of capital control practices. Finally, in the theoretical approach of the 
subject, empirical research and studies on capital controls are presented. 
 In the research part of the present study, the methodological research 
framework is also presented, then a series of tests are performed, analyzing and 
comparing the stock markets’ returns and volume, leading to a descriptive analysis of 
the data, in order to identify the markets’ patterns between the two periods. 
Meanwhile, the autocorrelation function of the returns is examined and the co-
movement between the returns and volume is tested. The findings of the research will 
enable drawing useful conclusions on the subject under consideration, conclusions 
that may be useful as a guide to future decisions that will facilitate the orderly 
functioning of the markets and reduce the negative effects of measures and policies 
implemented. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
1.1 Capital Controls 
 
1.1.1 Types of capital controls 
Capital controls are imposed when governments set restrictions on the inflow 
and outflow of capital into the economy. As each government’s goal is to ensure 
stability and long-term growth, in the context of a globalized market and economy, 
the effectiveness of the restrictive measures has been questioned in the past. 
Nowadays, in the modern economies, such restrictions are rarely imposed (Neely, 
1999). The types of Capital Controls are the following: 
a. Minimum Stay Requirements: In relation to capital investments, many 
countries enable the free movement of capital in and out of the country. 
Nevertheless, there is a fixed time framework in relation to the movement of 
inflows and outflows that determines the lock in period or a minimum stay 
requirement. 
 
b. Limitations: The money transferring out of the country is restricted by some 
countries or the citizens are not allowed to purchase foreign assets, while the 
foreigners are prohibited from acquiring domestic assets.  
 
c. Specific limitations based on the transaction: There are no reserve 
requirements that bear interest, taxes on the flows of portfolios or foreign 
assets, credit rating requirements for borrowing abroad, multiple exchange rate 
systems. 
 
d. Caps on Asset Sales: In many countries of the world, the strategic asset 
groups are prohibited from being sold to foreigners. The free movement of 
capital in and out of such economies is allowed in various sectors. 
 
e. Limit the Currency Trading: To maintain the currency exchange rate at 
steady levels, some countries impose restrictions on the amount of foreign 
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currency available for trading. In countries with particularly strong export 
activity, the control of the exchange rate can help in the better planning of the 
economic activity and increases the competitiveness of the economy. 
 
1.1.2 Effectiveness of capital restrictions 
Although the available literature on capital restrictions is widening over a long 
period of time, looking at different enforced regimes, the effectiveness of restrictions 
on capital controls still differs in the empirical studies conducted.  
To analyze the effectiveness of capital controls, researchers used a number of 
different methods, which largely depend on the frequency and quality of available 
data. In the study of Ariyoshi et al., descriptive statistics are used to achieve 
qualitative results of the capital restrictions’ effectiveness in Malaysia (1998), Spain 
(1992) and Thailand (1997). The researchers concluded that the capital outflow 
controls had only a temporary effect and, at best, provided the government with the 
necessary time to tackle macroeconomic abnormalities and implement structural 
reforms (Ariyoshi, et al., 2000).  
Through a comprehensive review of the empirical results on capital controls, 
little evidence suggests the effectiveness of capital restrictions, excluding Malaysia 
(1998), as the capital controls implemented were successful and favored the 
development of an autonomous monetary policy. However, several researchers 
support that Malaysia’s success was correlated with the Asian crisis ending and the 
recovering of the Asian economy capital controls implication (Magud, et al., 2011). 
Unlike the case of Malaysia (1998), Edison and Reinhart (2010) stated that 
exchange rate volatility in Thailand (1997) increased during the capital controls 
period and that capital restrictions failed to reduce the level of neither interest rates, 
nor even fluctuations in volatility. In addition, empirical analyses by Edison and 
Reinhart indicate that capital flows in Thailand increased during the period of the 
capital controls (Pasricha, et al., 2015). 
Unlike previous studies, data by Binici et al. report that capital outflow 
controls can be effective towards their objective. The authors made a fixed-effect 
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panel of 74 countries over the period 1995-2005 in order to determine the 
effectiveness of capital outflows using a panel with annual data of the net capital 
inflows and net outflows. Binici et al. argue that by separating net capital flow into 
net inflows and net outflows, research shows precise conclusions about the 
effectiveness of capital controls, as economically strong countries appear to be able to 
effectively impose capital controls (Binici, et al., 2010). 
 
1.1.3 Advantages and disadvantages of capital controls’ implementation 
It is difficult to identify the advantages and disadvantages of capital controls 
as they are directly linked to strategic choices of policy-makers to achieve objectives 
related to the regulation of national economies (Fratzscher, 2012; Neely, 1999). 
Capital controls are necessary in a system of fixed exchange rates if the monetary 
authority wishes to pursue an independent monetary policy centered on the domestic 
economy. This is a well-known option called Impossible trinity (also The Trilemma), 
which describes that only two of the following may occur in an open economy:  
a. Free flow of capital  
b. Fixed exchange rate  
c. Independent monetary policy 
Therefore, it is desired (b) and (c) to abandon (a) and impose some form of capital 
controls. Calvo & Reinhart found that many emerging market economies follow a de 
facto fixed exchange rate regime even when their exchange rate system is 
characterized as floating. Therefore, many of these countries have some form of 
capital controls.  
If exchange rate fluctuations in a country are high, then exchange rate 
fluctuations are passed on to the country's economy as a sharp change in inflation. 
Small, open, emerging market economies are particularly sensitive to the outflow of 
money from domestic capital markets. Capital controls can be used to limit this 
impact. For example, the Indian central bank has a ceiling on the percentage of 
foreign currency loans that Indian companies can buy abroad. The bank regularly 
reviews the quota (upwards or downwards) according to the Rupee / Dollar exchange 
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rate situation. Another example is recorded in 2013 when the Indian central bank 
lowered the outflow of personal capital to mitigate panic in the foreign exchange 
market. Normally, in emerging markets domestic businesses and households are able 
to borrow at lower rate from international markets. Usually, this is the case when 
there is a hard currency like the Dollar, Euro etc. If this is performed without any 
capital restrictions for a long period of time, then the economy will accumulate a large 
amount of foreign currency debt, which will limit the ability of the central bank to act 
as the lender of last resort. That could lead to large scale bankruptcies in crises and 
financial turmoil and is a recurring problem in open emerging markets. 
When countries consider the measures of capital controls, should be aware of 
the risks involved. There are significant disadvantages coming along with capital 
controls.  The process of enforcing and implementing capital controls entails high 
costs, in energy and time, for regulatory authorities, with no certainty that there will 
be no capital leakage. When there are no capital controls the investors can practice 
portfolio diversification and invest in international markets. In this way, they may 
achieve better returns adjusted to the risk. Companies can also take advantage from 
lower rates in loans from the international markets. In the presence of capital controls, 
domestic investors and businesses may face many difficulties, as rigorous fiscal 
policies may be implemented by governments, especially when there are long-term 
budget deficits and/or central banks that pursue inflationary policies. The direct 
effects of the capital controls on the financial markets include the impact on asset 
prices and returns. Furthermore, policy makers may influence the economic behavior 
in order to achieve their macroeconomic goals. Past studies argue that the cost of the 
capital minimizes since the reduction in the risk premium compensates the foreign 
investment barriers. Consequently, it can be supported that the investment barriers 
hampering international capital flows will lead to an increase of the risk premium and 
the result will be an increase in the cost of capital.  
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1.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
1.2.1 Meaning and conditions 
An effective capital market in which securities prices are rapidly adjusted to 
any new information emerging in the investment environment and therefore, at any 
time, share prices reflect all available information (or which may be disclosed) in the 
market. The Effective Market Theory is a field of academic research that displays the 
most contradictory conclusions and most peculiar views. The conditions for an 
effective market are as follows (Vasiliou, 2008): 
a. There are many participants who, independently of each other, analyze and evaluate 
shares. 
b. Any new information about a company or its share appears on the market entirely 
randomly and independently of other events. 
c. Trading investors make adjustments to share prices so that at all times they reflect 
all available information. 
The aforementioned conditions lead to the conclusion that, share prices must 
move completely randomly, regardless of the occurrence of any events involving 
listed companies. However, this does not apply either in absolute terms or in 
comparative terms. Also, an efficient market requires that a very large number of 
investors monitor and analyze each share, so when the price of the latter is 
“automatically” adjusted to each new piece of information, this is done by an 
increasing number of participants. The larger the number of investors participating in 
a market and indirectly “adjusting” its share prices, the more effective that market is. 
However, it should be noted that at any given time, the share prices must reflect not 
only all information available to the investors, but also the investment risk involved in 
the allocation of funds to the stock exchange. 
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1.2.2 Forms of EMH 
Fama (1970) defined three types of an efficient market, the weak, the semi-
strong and the strong form (Vasiliou, 2008). The weak form of efficiency argues that 
current share prices already reflect all the historical data of the market, such as past 
prices and volume of transactions. The claim of the weaker form of efficiency is very 
consistent with the findings of the random walk hypothesis that price changes over 
time are independent of each other. In other words, one cannot achieve excessive 
returns only by looking at the historical price trends. Therefore, techniques of trend 
analysis, techniques that use past share price movements to find indications to predict 
the future course of one or all of the stock markets, are useless. However, one can 
achieve excessive returns in the weak form of an efficient market by using 
fundamental analysis or by using confidential information. 
The semi-strong form of efficiency implies that, in addition to past prices, all 
information available to the public, including core data on company products, 
profitability forecasts, dividends, split share announcements, management quality, 
balances, patents held by a company, accounting practices, etc., should be fully 
reflected in the current prices of the securities and cannot be used to predict future 
prices and excessive profits. Thus, one cannot achieve excessive returns using a 
fundamental market analysis that is effective in the semi-strong form. It is obvious 
that technical analysis cannot work in the semi-strong form of an efficient market 
because if a market is effective in a semi-strong form, it is also effective in the weak 
because information on past prices is also available to the public. However, investors 
with internal information can achieve excessive returns in the semi-strong form of 
efficiency. 
A strong form of efficiency means that the market prices reflect all 
information, including past prices, all publicly available information, and all private 
information. Even unpublished information (or internal, unavailable to the investing 
public) is reflected in the current prices and cannot be used for future forecasts. In 
such a market, the prices will always be fair and any investor, even those holding 
confidential information, could not beat the market. That is, there is no special 
category of investors who have exclusive access to information that may affect share 
prices. Again, none of the technical or fundamental analyzes can lead to excessive 
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returns, since if a market is effective in its strong form, it must be effective in both the 
weak form and the semi-strong form. Thus, techniques that do not work in the weak 
and semi-strong form cannot function in the strong form of efficient markets. If a 
market is highly effective it is also effective in its semi-strong and weak form, but not 
the opposite. 
 
1.3 Psychology and Behavior of Investors 
According to traditional economic theory and the theory of market efficiency, 
investors and markets are rational in making financial decisions, i.e. trying to 
maximize the benefit and minimize costs. Rational thinking can lead to making 
irrational decisions when taken in a misunderstood context. Additional individual or 
social biases urge people to overstate or underestimate information, adhere to specific 
views, or fail to recognize opportunities. Thus, the objectivity of opinions and 
decisions is influenced by factors that ultimately form subjective views and actions. 
This assumption demonstrates that, the better understanding of the context that is 
shaped by behaviors and habits (factors that inhibit rational decision making), the 
easier it will be to overcome them or to deal with them more effectively. More 
specifically, the socio-psychological factors that determine the behavior of investors 
are (Siegel & Yacht, 2012): 
a. Biases: Predisposition to specific views that prevent rational decision making. Such 
biases are the availability of information (which, based on the frequency that is 
revealed, create opinions that are considered to be more or less valid), stereotypes, 
over-confidence, attachment to past knowledge, humans need to avoid unclear or 
uncertain situations, etc.  
b. Framing: The framework where each person determines and recognizes 
alternatives to decision-making. Any short-sighted views or oversimplified situations 
and data, form a more limited framework of thought, reducing the range of alternative 
actions and leading to subjective decisions. 
c. The profile of investors: The combination of all individual traits, such as 
personality, age, living conditions, income, etc., which stimulate the way people act. 
These traits determine the level of tolerance to risk and affect the economic decisions. 
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The financial phenomena can be better explained when the financial models 
recognize that the market participants are not fully rational. Thus, while traditional 
financial theory is not discarded, an attempt is made to bridge it with the practice that 
in many cases (financial crises, financial bubbles, financial distortions, etc.) deviates 
from the theory (Barberis & Thaler, 2003). 
 
1.4 Indicative examples of capital control practices 
 
1.4.1 The case of Greece 
Capital controls were imposed on Greece on June 28, 2015, when Greece's 
government came to the end of the rescue bail-out period without further agreement 
with its creditors, and therefore the European Central Bank decided not to increase the 
level of the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) for Greek banks. The banks and the 
Athens Stock Exchange were closed until July 6th. In the wake of the decision to hold 
a referendum by the country's prime minister, an upheaval on the Asian and European 
stock exchanges occurred on 29 June (Monokrousos, et al., 2016; Newsbeast, 2017).  
Controls on bank transfers from Greek banks to foreign banks, and limits on 
cash withdrawals (only €60 per day permitted) took place, to avoid an uncontrolled 
bank run and a complete collapse of the Greek banking system. Electronic 
transactions within the country were unaffected as all transactions using a credit or 
debit card and other electronic payment methods were normally conducted. The 
Government set up a special Bank Transactions Committee, the State Treasury, in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Greece, the Hellenic Bank 
Association and the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission. The Committee's 
mission was to deal with requests for urgent and necessary payments, which could not 
be met by the cash withdrawal or electronic transactions.  
Greek stock market suffered as international players and hedge funds 
liquidated their positions and could not be replaced by Greek investors who could not 
buy stock, resulting in the collapse of Greek companies as their market value lost up 
to 90 percent of their value in three days. The Athens stock exchange ended its torrid 
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first day of trading 16.2 percent lower, after it reopened for the first time in five 
weeks.  
In September 2015, certain aspects of the imposed capital controls were 
relaxed. Four months after capital controls were imposed on 28 June 2015, the 
government published two important modifications: withdrawals were still up to €420 
per week and account holders were able from this time to withdraw the entire amount 
in one transaction and not in sums of €60 per day. Therefore, the amount of time 
waiting in queues at banks and ATMs was dramatically reduced, and, furthermore, up 
to 10% could be withdrawn from funds deposited in Greece from abroad.  
In the third quarter of 2015, shortly after the implementation of the capital 
controls, the Greek economy returned to negative growth rates (-1.7% in annual base) 
after 5 consecutive quarters of positive real GDP growth (+ 0.8% on average). Despite 
the negative impact of the restrictions on capital movements, the recession in the 
whole of the previous year proved to be much milder than the original projections. At 
the same time, domestic demand had a negative contribution, mainly due to the large 
drop in inventories while net exports moved in the opposite direction due to the 
significant contraction in imports. 
Private sector deposits (non-financial corporations and households) showed 
stability following the restrictions on capital flows. According to the latest data 
deriving from the Bank of Greece, deposits in June 2016 increased by approximately 
€ 1 billion (+ 0.9%) on a monthly basis and by € 1.9 billion (+ 1.6%). compared to 
July 2015 (the first month of implementation of restrictions). In addition, it is 
estimated that € 4 billion total bank notes have returned to the domestic banking 
system in the last 18 months. Greece, nowadays, remains under the restrictions of 
capital controls and is not expected to lift them completely, any sooner than the end of 
2018. Since September 2017 citizens can withdraw a total of 1,800 euros in cash per 
month. 
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1.4.2 The case of Cyprus 
During the major financial crisis in 14th April 2013, Cypriot banks remained 
closed for 12 days following a common decision of the Cyprus Government and the 
Central Bank of Cyprus. The closure of the banks was considered necessary to avoid 
the "bank run" phenomenon, i.e. the massive turnout of depositors with take-back 
requests because of the reduced confidence in the banking system. It should be noted 
that the size of the banking sector in Cyprus was disproportionate to the Cypriot 
economy, as it reached 800% of GDP (ACCB, 2016). 
In order to overcome the crisis, Cyprus, the International Monetary Fund and 
the European Union signed an agreement, a ‘’Memorandum of Understanding’’, that 
consisted of 40% "haircut" in the deposits exceeding 100,000 Euros. The merger of 
the two major country’s banks of the, the Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus was the 
result of the joint agreement. Capital controls had been maintained for 2 years after 
their implementation and have led to significant economic difficulties in Cyprus; 
blowing off the country's credibility and reporting tourism’s decline. The capital 
controls were lifted in 2015, with the last controls being removed in April 2015. The 
main points of the imposed restrictive measures were the following: 
• A daily take-over cap was established at 300 Euros. 
• Foreign travelers were allowed to have up to 2,000 Euros with them. 
• Especially for students abroad, they could receive a wire transfer of up to 5,000 
Euros per quarter. 
• Any currency export for foreign investment was banned. 
• It was possible to use a check only for deposits in the name of the beneficiary. 
• The intra-Cypriot transactions required supporting documents for the transfer of 
funds. 
• The tourists who were in Cyprus at that time were not allowed to leave the island 
with more than 1,000 Euros in cash with them. 
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1.4.3 The case of Russia 
In 2014, there was a political and diplomatic crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine ongoing, due to the Russian invasion in Crimea that contributed to 
international sanctions against Russia. These sanctions demolished the ruble, 
destabilized the Russian economy, leading to a financial crisis. Russia imposed 
unofficial capital controls, to prevent a recurrence of inflation and another financial 
crisis like 1998. The Russian stock market experienced large decline, with a 30% drop 
in the RTS Index during December of 2014. The Russian government set limits on the 
net foreign exchange assets of state-owned exporters. Furthermore, to protect 
additional currency devaluation, government agencies with a strong export activity 
(such as Gazprom, Rosneft) have been instructed to reduce their foreign currency 
reserves. The unofficial measures aimed at increasing the strength of the national 
currency and reducing capital outflows from the country. Russian legal entities ought 
to buy foreign currency on the local currency market in order to pay invoices of 
foreign suppliers or to make interest and dividends payments (Kelly et al., 2014). 
 
1.5 Review of previous empirical studies on capital controls 
Edison and Reinhart (2000) studied the impact of capital controls on exchange 
rates, the stock market and interest rates, in time of crisis, in Malaysia where the 
measures were imposed in the period from 1998 to 1999 and in Thailand in 1997. The 
purpose of both measures was to protect the currency against speculative attacks and 
to stabilize the exchange rate. In the case of Malaysia, various measures were enacted, 
including the ban on foreign currency exportation, the requirement to repatriate 
capital held abroad, the blocking of non-residents’ transfer of capital abroad and other 
restrictions on the transfer of capital by residents. In the case of Thailand, a two-tier 
currency market was created, blocking the access to finance for opportunists. The 
effect of the measures on Malaysia on the stock exchange was negative, affecting in 
particular the stock prices and not so much the volume of transactions, while the 
fluctuations increased in both countries (Edison & Reinhart, 2000). 
The case of capital audits in Malaysia was also studied in a 2003 research by 
Johnson & Mitton. Focusing on the effect of the measures on the stock exchange rates 
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(using the country’s most liquid shares), it was found that in all (financial and non-
financial) companies there was a significant drop in prices over the period (within one 
year their value decreased by 78.5%). During the measures there was an increase of 
39.7% and then the increase reached 81.9%. It was also found that companies linked 
to the government were more affected than the rest, both negatively before the 
measures and positively afterwards (Johnson & Mitton, 2003). 
On December 18, 2006, capital controls were announced by the Bank of 
Thailand, the day zero for the stock market control before and after the imposition of 
the measures according to Vithessonthi and Tongurai (2009). The measures taken 
were related to the short-term capital inflows, namely the mandatory advance 
payment (30% of the value) as a mandatory reserve for foreign exchange transactions 
worth more than $20,000. This measure aimed at discouraging short-term speculative 
capital inflows as only 70% of the total capital transferred will be at the disposal of 
the traders to invest in the domestic stock market. The return of 30% of the capital 
(mandatory reserve) is reimbursed if the capital remains in the country for more than 
one year, and if it is repatriated that amount is seized. This measure excludes foreign 
exchange transactions related to trade in goods and services, and the repatriation of 
capital by residents of the country that have acquired foreign investment and foreign 
direct investment. The control of the stock market returns was performed in 60 listed 
companies (belonging to the industrial sector) and before the date of the 
announcement of the measures, while no statistically significant correlations of 
abnormal returns were found, as opposed to the following period. On the day of the 
announcement, the stock index fell by 2.39%, while the next day by 14.84%, showing 
a maximum decrease of 19.52%. Two days later (December 20th), after the bank gave 
details of the measures, the stock market reacted positively (+ 1.24%) (Vithessonthi & 
Tongurai, 2009). 
Alfaro, Chari, and Kanczuk (2014) investigated the impact on stock exchange 
returns of the capital controls imposed on Brazil in 2008-2009. In the pre-crisis period 
of 2008-2009, the Brazilian economy experienced significant growth in economic 
activity abroad. The crisis, coupled with an increase in inflows of foreign capital into 
the country, brought upward pressures on the currency’s exchange rate. In order to 
prevent a massive influx of foreign capital, currency stabilization and inflation, in 
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2008 the central bank announced measures. In March 2008, inbound fixed income 
foreign investment, a financial transaction tax of 1.5% was imposed, although this 
measure was withdrawn in early 2009 to reduce the outflow of investment. Under a 
new wave of massive capital inflows, the measure was reinstated in October 2009, 
raising the tax to 2%, excluding foreign direct investment, while in October 2010 the 
tax rose to 6% and was removed in December 2011. This measure led to an increase 
in the capital cost of enterprises and a significant reduction in abnormal returns. The 
measure mainly affected the stock prices of smaller and more introverted firms, as 
well as firms with greater dependence on external financing (Alfaro, et al., 2014). 
It appears that the nature and intensity of the measures taken when imposing 
capital controls and the intended purpose are decisive factors for the reaction of the 
domestic market to them. It is certain that any interventions in the transactions create 
uncertainty in the market and in particular to investors, which usually translates into 
increased volatility in stock exchange transactions. At the same time, the general 
economic situation and the economic conjuncture seem to be influenced by the way 
investors perceive the measures imposed and thus their reaction to them. The study of 
three different situations, both in terms of the general economic situation and the 
diversity of the capital controls imposed on Greece, Cyprus and Russia, is expected to 
provide useful information on how capital measures affect the stock market. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology  
2.1 Sample  
This research consists of the analysis of the returns and volume of the main 
stock market indices and afterwards the big capitalization indices respectively, for 
Greece, Cyprus and Russia. In specific, we analyzed for Greece, the Athens Stock 
Exchange General Index ASE and Large Capitalization Index FTSE. For Cyprus, 
likewise, the general stock market index CYSM and FTSE_CY. Lastly, for Russia, 
the general stock market index INDEXCF and MXR respectively. Data were derived 
from Bloomberg Database, such as the acronyms for the indices under analysis, using 
a sample of 250 observations for each period. The data consist of daily last prices of 
the indices, from 2012 to 2017, due to the limitations of the Bloomberg Database.  
 
2.2 Statistical Analysis 
In this study, we presented at first, the charts of the stock prices of the indices. 
Then, we analyzed the stock exchange returns and volume of each index before and 
after the implementation of the capital controls, testing for stationarity and 
autocorrelation. After that, we presented the descriptive statistics for the return and 
volume. Finally, we tested for cointegration between the returns and volume for each 
index. 
In specific, we have used initially diagrams in order to examine the time series 
development over time. We have examined whether the time series are stationary or 
not, graphically. A non-stationarity variable is a variable with a changing mean, 
variance. Non–stationarity is caused by trends in variables and there are two broad 
types of trends: deterministic trend and a stochastic trend (Baddeley M.C, 2009). 
After that, we used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to test if a variable follows a 
unit-root process.  The null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, and the 
alternative is that the variable was generated by a stationary process. In case that the 
variable is not stationary we take the first difference, second, third, etc. Moreover, we 
have examined the correlogram for the returns (the returns of the time series were 
calculated as Ln of the ratio of Rt to Rt-1 for each index), whether there is an 
autocorrelation.  
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Additionally, in order to test whether the returns and the volume cointegrate 
we have used the Engle-Granger two-step method since we have two time series. 
Also, a t-test comparison has been conducted for all the indexes comparing their mean 
values before and after the capital controls.  
Last but not least, we have constructed three dummy variables for each 
country labeled as “crisis” (1=after the capital control, before the capital controls).  
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Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Greece 
According to Figure 1 there is an intense negative trend for the market price of 
the ASE index from July 2014 until the end of 2015. In July 2015, we can observe 
that the announcement of the capital controls implementation and the occurring 
banking crisis did not affect in a profound way the downwarding trend of the index 
till early 2016 when the index starts to rise and seems to stabilize. 
Figure 1. ASE Index 
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According to Figure 2 there is an intense negative trend for the FTSE index 
from July 2014 until the end of 2015. In 2016 the index is almost steady. The FTSE 
index seems to follow the ASE index for the entire period.  
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Figure 2. FTSE Index 
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
F
T
S
E
01 Jul 14 01 Jan 15 01 Jul 15 01 Jan 16 01 Jul 16
DateGr
 
According to Figure 3 the return of the ASE index does not present any trend 
and the volatility is almost constant. Only exception a negative spike in July 2015 
when the capital controls implemented.  
Figure 3. Return of ASE Index 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, R_ASE 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -20,035 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 1 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-20,035<-2.570).  
According to Figure 4, the volatility of the ASE index is more intense in 2015. 
In the first and last quarter of 2015 there are 2 spikes, the first one is due to the 
implementation of the capitals controls.  
Figure 4. Volume of ASE index 
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, V_ASE 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -9,755 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 2 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-9,755<-2.570).  
According to Figure 5 the return of the FTSE index does not present any trend 
and the volatility is almost constant. Only exception a negative spike in July 2015 
after the implementation of the capital controls.  Also, we have to mention that the 
FTSE index follows almost the same pattern of the ASE index.  
Figure 5.  Return of FTSE index   
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
R
_
F
T
S
E
01 Jul 14 01 Jan 15 01 Jul 15 01 Jan 16 01 Jul 16
DateGr
 
 31 
Table 3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, R_FTSE 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -19,833 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 3 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-19,833<-2.570).  
According to Figure 6 the volatility of the FTSE index is more intense in 
2015. Also, there is a spike in the end of 2015, it is similar with the spike of the 
volatility of ASE index.  
Figure 6. Volume of FTSE index 
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Table 4. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, V_FTSE 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -9,712 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 4 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-9,712<-2.570). 
In order to identify the number of the lags of the R_ASE and R_FTSE we 
have calculated the autocorrelations (Table 1 & Table 2, Appendix). There is no 
indication of autocorrelation for both series.  In the following two graphs (Figures 7 & 
8), the autocorrelations are too low.  
Figure 7. Correlogram, R_ASE 
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Figure 8. Correlogram, R_FTSE 
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Finally, table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the under-analysis indices 
of Greece. 
Table 5.  Descriptive statistics before and after the crisis 
Before Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CV 
R_ASE 250 -.0019727 .0294531 -.1366886 .1068063 1493,03% 
V_ASE 250 1.27e+08 8.50e+07 2.75e+07 6.58e+08 66,92% 
R_FTSE 250 -.0022483 .0318232 -.1384395 .117394 1415,43% 
V_FTSE 250 1.24e+08 8.36e+07 2.67e+07 6.54e+08 64,41% 
After Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CV 
R_ASE 250 -.0014744 .0260726 -.1771289 .0896675 1768,35% 
V_ASE 250 1.41e+08 1.04e+08 6325918 7.23e+08 73,75% 
R_FTSE 250 -.0019961 .0312737 -.1787792 .110564 1566,74% 
V_FTSE 250 1.34e+08 1.03e+08 3466047 7.21e+08 76,86% 
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According to table 5 it can be seen that the average values of the returns and 
the volume are almost the same before and after the capital controls. However, this is 
not true for the volatility, since the standard deviation after the capital controls has 
higher values compared with the time period before the capitals controls. The 
increased volatility can be easily seen if we notice the coefficient of variation. The 
values of the CV are higher after the capitals controls not only for the returns but also 
for the volume. 
In addition, we have conducted a t-test comparison before and after the capital 
controls for all the above indexes. The results were the following:  
R_ASE (t(490.77)= -0.20, p= 0.84), R_FTSE (t(497.84)= -0.08, p= 0.92), V_FTSE 
(t(477.55)= -1.22, p= 0.22), V_ASE (t(478.86)= -1.68, p= 0.09). The t-test confirmed 
that the average values of the returns and the volume are almost the same before and 
after the capital controls.  
Also, we have tested whether the pair of variables R_ASE /V_ASE and 
R_FTSE /V_FTSE cointegrate or not. The analysis resulted that both pairs cointegrate 
(Appendix).  
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3.2 Cyprus  
According to Figure 9 there is a downwarding trend till April 2013, when 
capital controls were implemented in Cyprus, for the general stock market index 
CYSM. After the capital controls were implemented, there is an imminent freezing 
period in the market, almost stable, until the October of the same year when the 
market seems to ‘’wake up’’. After October 2013 it follows an upward trend.  
Figure 9. CYSM index 
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According to Figure 10 there is a declined trend before the October of 2013 for the 
stock market index FTSE_CY, after the October of the same year it follows an 
upward trend. The pattern of the FTSE_CY is almost identical to the CYSM.   
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Figure 10. FTSE_CY index 
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Figure 11. Return of CYSM index 
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According to Figure 11 the returns of CYSM are stable without any trend.  
However, after the April of 2013 with the implementation of the capital controls and 
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until October of the same year the volatility is very limited.  The time series looks 
stationary. 
Table 6. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, R_CYSM 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -16,654 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 6 it is concluded that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root meaning that the time variable is stationary 
process (-16,654<-2.570). 
According to Figure 12 the volatility of the CYSM after the April of 2013 is 
very limited since the capital controls have been implemented.  
Figure 12. Volume of CYSM index 
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Table 7. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, V_CYSM 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -11,833 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 7 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-11,833<-2.570).  
According to Figure 13 the returns of FTSE_CY are stable without any trend.    
The FTSE_CY follows the same the pattern with the CYSM_CY.  
Figure 13. Return of FTSE_CY index 
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Table 8. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, R_FTSE_CY 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -16,035 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 8 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-16,035<-2.570). 
 According to Figure 13 the volatility of the FTSE_CY after the April of 2013 
is very limited. The volatility of the FTSE_CY index is almost identical to the 
volatility of the CYSM index.  
Figure 14. Volume of FTSE_CY index 
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Table 9. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, V_FTSE_CY 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -10,781 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 9 we observe that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-10,781<-2.570). 
In order to identify the number of the lags of the R_CYSM and R_FTSE_CY 
we have calculated the autocorrelations (Table 3 & Table 4, Appendix). After lag 3 
there is a statistical significant correlation for R_CYSM. For R_FTSE_CY only lag 2 
is not statistical significant.  However, all autocorrelations are very low according to 
the following two graphs (Figure 15 & 16).  
Figure 15. Correlogram, R_CYSM 
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Figure 16. Correlogram, R_FTSE_CY 
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Finally, we present the descriptive statistics of the under-analysis indices of 
Cyprus. 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics before and after the crisis - Cyprus 
Before Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CV 
R_CYSM 114 -.0014164 .0399709 -.1552499 .1267687 2822,01% 
V_CYSM 114 5849566 7610764 35810 5.61e+07 130,10% 
R_FTSE_CY 114 -.0014064 .0363786 -.1423042 .1159667 2586,65% 
V_FTSE_CY 114 5945353 7665747 39610 5.62e+07 128,93% 
After  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CV 
R_CYSM 250 .000699 .0250719 -.1403973 .142993 3586,82% 
V_CYSM 250 824210.4 1554808 18920 2.15e+07 188,64% 
R_FTSE_CY 250 .0016039 .0257207 -.1051968 .1244337 1603,30% 
V_FTSE_CY 250 908577.2 1581413 29629 2.16e+07 174,05% 
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According to table 10, it can be seen that the average values of the returns and 
the volume are not the same before and after the capital controls. The mean of the 
returns slightly increased while we observe a sharp decrease in volume, for both 
indices. Regarding the volatility, the standard deviation after the capital controls has 
higher values compared with the time period before the capitals controls. The 
increased volatility can be easily seen if we notice the coefficient of variation. The 
values of the CV are higher after the capitals controls not only for the returns but also 
for the volume (only exception the R_FTSE_CY).  
In the analysis of Cyprus, we had to limit our sample before the ‘’crisis’’, that 
is the capital controls, from 250 to 112 observations due to lack of data.  
In addition, we have conducted a t-test comparison before and after the capital 
controls for all the above indexes. The results were the following:  
R_CYSM (t(154.92)= -0.52, p= 0.60), R_FTSE_CY (t(166.46)= -0.79, p= 0.42), 
V_CYSM (t(117.32)= 6.98, p= 0.00), V_FTSE_CY (t(117.40)=6 .94, p= 0.00). The t-
test confirmed that the average values of the returns are almost the same before and 
after the capital controls. This is not true for the volume of the indices. 
Also, we have tested whether the pair of variables R_CYSM /V_CYSM and 
R_FTSE_CY /V_FTSE_CY cointegrate or not.  The analysis resulted that both pairs 
cointegrate (Appendix).  
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3.3 Russia  
According to figure 17 the stock index exhibits a downward trend over the 
time period with a spike on January 2015 after the informal capital controls.   
Figure 17. INDEXCF index 
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According to figure 18 the MXR index exhibits a downward trend over the 
time period with a spike on January 2015 after the capital controls.   This index has 
the same pattern with the previous one.  
Figure 18. MXR index 
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According to figure 19, the R_INDEXCF seems stationary with only one spike 
on January 2015.  
Figure 19. Return of INDEXCF index 
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Table 11. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, R_INDEXCF 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -21,760 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 11 it is observed that we must reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-21,760<-2.570). 
According to figure 20 the V_INDEX exhibits a downward trend during the 
whole-time period with two spikes on January and June 2015.  
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Figure 20. Volume of INDEXCF index 
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Table 12. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, V_INDEX 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -5,637 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 12 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-5,637<-2.570). 
According to figure 21 the R_MXR index seems stationary with only one 
spike on January 2015. 
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Figure 21. Return of MXR index 
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Table 13. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, R_MXR 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -18,260 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 13 it can be observed that we have to reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-18,260<-2.570). 
According to figure 22, the volatility of the MXR index exhibits a lot of 
volatility during whole period, this volatility is more intense on January and June 
2015.   
 47 
Figure 22. Volatility of MXR index 
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Table 14. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, V_MXR 
 1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical 
Test Statistic 
Z(t) -8,485 
Value Value Value 
-3.449 -2.874 -2.570 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.7054 
From table 14 it can be observed that we must reject the null hypothesis; the 
variable does not contain a unit root which means that the time variable is stationary 
process (-8,485<-2.570). 
In order to identify the number of the lags of the R_INDEX and R_MXR we 
have calculated the autocorrelations (Table 5 & Table 6, Appendix). There is no 
indication of autocorrelation as it can be seen from the two correlograms below 
(figures 23 & 24): 
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Figure 23. Correlogram, R_INDEXCF 
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Figure 24. Correlogram, R_MXR 
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Finally, we present the descriptive statistics of the indices under-analysis. 
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Table 15. Descriptive statistics before and after the crisis - Russia 
Before Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CV 
R_INDEXCF 250 -.0011271 .0188 -.1278082 .0634182 1668,00% 
V_INDEXCF 250 8.07e+10 4.48e+10 2.25e+10 2.44e+11 55,51% 
R_MXR 250 -.0010678 .0168445 -.1186401 .0609819 1577,50% 
V_MXR 249 4.59e+10 3.01e+10 858666 1.54e+11 65,57% 
After Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CV 
R_INDEXCF 250 .0000806 .027711 -.123341 .1444466  34380,8% 
V_INDEXCF 250 3.43e+10 3.03e+10 6.15e+09 1.91e+11 88,33% 
R_MXR 250 -.0003729 .0277979 -.1347687 .1413403 7454,52% 
V_MXR 249 3.42e+10 3.10e+10 273628 1.68e+11 90,64% 
According to table 15, the average values of the returns and the volume are not 
the same before and after the capital controls. As regards the returns, we notice a 
stability in the values, slightly a minor increase in the mean values, however, the 
mean of the volume drops significantly, for both indices. The standard deviation after 
the capital controls has higher values compared with the time period before the capital 
controls, for the returns and volume, for both indices. The increased volatility can be 
easily seen if we notice the coefficient of variation. The values of the CV are higher 
after the capitals controls not only for the returns but also for the volume.  
In addition, we have conducted a t-test comparison before and after the capital 
controls for all the above indexes. The results were the following:  
R_INDEXCF (t(438.145)= -0.57, p= 0.56), R_MXR (t(410.13)= -0.33, p= 0.73), 
V_INDEXF (t(437.29)= 13.56, p= 0.00), V_MXR (t(495.57)= 4.26, p= 0.00). The t-
test confirmed that the average values of the returns are almost the same before and 
after the capital controls. This is not true for the volume for both indexes.  
Also, we have tested whether the pair of variables R_ASE /V_ASE and 
R_FTSE /V_FTSE cointegrates or not. The analysis resulted that both pairs 
cointegrate (Appendix).  
 
 50 
Chapter 4: Empirical Findings and Discussion 
The purpose of this research is to study the stock markets’ pattern in Greece, 
Cyprus and Russia, following the announcement and imposition of capital controls. 
More specifically, prices, returns and the volume of transactions in general stock 
indices and high capitalization indices were studied, for about one year (except for 
Cyprus where the time was shorter, about five months) and one year after the 
implementation of the measures concerned, for each country individually. 
For Greece, the ASE and FTSE performances, as well as their trading volume, 
present the same behavior before and after the crisis, i.e. they move in the same way. 
Volume, in fact, is positively related to the magnitude of the price changes (Jonathan 
M. Karpoff). Regarding Cyprus, the fact that the general index and the large cap index 
are almost identical, shows that the bulk of the transactions are carried out in relation 
to these companies, while the smaller companies do not play a significant role in the 
market, nor do they determine the developments significantly. Lastly, we observe a 
similarity in the patterns of the indices in Russia compared to Greece and Cyprus.  
  
4.1 Returns of Greece, Cyprus and Russia 
Even though the trends of the indices of the Greek, Cypriot and Russian stock 
market are not the same, we identify some common features regarding stock exchange 
returns. We notice that for the period immediately after the imposition of the capital 
controls, in all three countries the stock market returns have fallen significantly, 
showing once again that investors’ imminent response to adverse and restrictive 
measures is strongly negative. In the following period though, the results did not show 
any significant deviations from returns in the prior period, for all countries under 
analysis.  
Specifically, in Greece, there is a small decline in the average of negative 
returns, for both indices, that is to say, a small improvement has been observed in 
marginal terms, after capital controls. As regards the volatility of the returns, we 
observe that the standard deviation after the capital controls is decreased. If we take, 
however, into consideration the coefficient of variation, which is a more accurate and 
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reliable measure for volatility, we conclude that volatility has slightly increased 
compared with the prior period. Of course, the small improvement in stock market 
returns is in line with the case of Malaysia, where the impact of the capital controls on 
the country’s most liquid stocks was examined, and it was found that after their 
imposition there was a rise in the stock market returns (Johnson & Mitton, 2003).  
In the case of Cyprus, we detect a minor increase in the markets’ returns; the 
market had negative returns before, while after the capital controls the mean values 
are positive. As regards the volatility of the returns, we observe that the standard 
deviation after the capital controls is also decreased, as in Greece. Taking into 
consideration however, the coefficient of variation, we conclude that volatility 
increased for the general market index CYSM and decreased for the large 
capitalization index FTSE_CY, compared with the prior period before the capital 
controls. 
In Russia, there is an improvement in the mean values of the returns, in 
marginal terms, for both indices, after the capital restrictions. Also, the volatility of 
the returns was higher for both indices, compared to the prior period. To be precise, 
we observe an enormous increase in Russia, which is correlated to the grave political 
crisis between Russia and Ukraine, the Russian military intervention in Crimea and 
the ominous international sanctions that were imposed to Russia afterwards. The 
panic and fear of the investors are reflected in the figures of volatility. 
These findings, though, are incompatible with several previous research 
studies, due to the fact that there was an economic recession at the time and the values 
of the indices were on a downward trend because of the economic turmoil in the 
market, thus, the impact of the measures imposed were probably carried away by the 
preceding economic environment.  
 
4.2 Volume of Greece, Cyprus and Russia 
As for the volume of transactions, in Greece the results do not show large 
discrepancies in the period after the capital controls, although there is a minimal 
increase in the average volume of transactions. It was also found that, after the capital 
controls, that the standard deviation was lower. Nevertheless, looking at the 
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coefficient of variation we detect that the volatility increased. The fact of increased 
volatility is proportional to the results of previous research studies, which show that 
the imposition of capital controls implies increased volatility in the stock market 
(Edison & Reinhart, 2000; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). The paradox in the case of 
Greece is that after the imposition of the measures, the average volume of transactions 
in the stock exchange has increased in contrast with Cyprus and Russia, and, given the 
reduced liquidity of Greek investors (due to the measures), we can assume that the 
presence of foreign investors may be stronger. 
In the case of Cyprus, due to the major haircut in deposits, several months the 
stock market movement had been frozen, and transactions were minimal, yielding 
zero returns to investors, in the period succeeding the capital controls. Thus, after the 
imposition of the measures, the volume of transactions had a steep drop and there was 
more volatility (taking into account the coefficient of variation) related to Greece. 
Knowing that the size of the stock market in Cyprus is much smaller can probably 
explain the strongest impact on the stock market transactions. Also, the imposition of 
measures, such as nominal transactions and accompanying documents for the transfer 
of capital, and the fact that the country’s financial system relies heavily on foreign 
deposits, restrained investors’ activity and decreased liquidity.  
Almost the same results we see in Russia, where the volume of transactions 
fell dramatically after the capital restrictions. We observe the same pattern in Russia, 
where standard deviation also decreased, and the coefficient of variation increased, 
resulting in increased volatility for both indices. The decrease in the average values of 
volume and volatility are strongly related with the political instability, the 
international sanctions and the capital restrictions that took place in Russia at the time. 
 
4.3 Returns’ and volume’ cointegration for the countries under 
analysis 
Furthermore, a co-movement between the time series of returns and the 
volume of transactions was identified for all three stock markets. Stock returns are 
positively related to the contemporary change in trading volume (Chandrapala, 
Pathirawasam, 2011). Investors tend to be riskier when the market goes up, so they 
invest more and this result to an increase of the volume of shares. One the other hand 
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when the market goes down the investors tend to be more conservative, resulting to a 
decrease of the volume of shares.  In Greece, we observe a downwarding trend before 
the capital controls, that continues till the end of 2015. The agreement between 
Greece and its creditors, the political and financial stability that followed, let the 
market stabilize, reassured investors’ fears and suspicions about the economic 
environment and led to a minor increase in returns and volume.  
In Cyprus, we detect at first a diminishing trend in the market till the capital 
controls, then a period of stability and several months later an upwarding trend. In 
April 2013, the agreement of the economic adjustment program for Cyprus was 
signed and we observe minimal movements in the market afterwards. This agreement 
led to a minor increase in returns and a major decline in volume of transactions, which 
is justified if we take into consideration the haircut of the deposits that took place that 
period.  
Lastly, we observe a turmoil in the stock market in Russia. In 2014 we see a 
downfall, while in 2015 Russian market seems to recuperate and stabilizes. The 
reasoning is political: the Ukraine crisis and invasion in Crimea took place in 2014, 
when economic sanctions were forced that affected the stock market, naturally. We 
detect a downwarding trend in the stock market and the volume. Russia, in the end of 
2014, imposed capital restrictions and the results are reflected in the market: we 
actually see a small increase in returns and the volume stabilizes in 2015. We 
conclude, therefore, that these restrictions helped the market to balance and Russia 
avoided another financial crisis.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions  
In the aftermath of our research, we can conclude that capital controls have 
indeed a negative impact on the stock markets, however not to the extent that 
someone could expect. Specifically, the analysis conducted above showed that, the 
average values of the returns for both indices in Greece, slightly increased, after the 
implementation of capital controls. An important result of the analysis was the 
increased volatility after the capital controls, for the returns and the volume for both 
indexes, ASE & FTSE, which verifies previous empirical research. This means that, 
the market was more unstable and less predictable after the capital controls compared 
before the capital controls even though the mean values were the same for the returns 
and the volume between the two periods.  
As far as Cyprus and Russia are concerned, the analysis resulted in almost the 
same conclusions for the returns. In both countries the returns increased in marginal 
terms after the capital restrictions. Nevertheless, the volume of transactions decreased 
significantly in Cyprus and Russia, in contrast with Greece, where we detect a higher 
number of transactions after the capital controls compared to the period before the 
capital controls. Volatility in Cyprus and Russia was significantly higher for both 
returns and volume (except for the returns of the Cypriot index FTSE_CY) after the 
capital controls. A tremendous increase in the volatility of the returns for the two 
Russian indices is highlighted, indicating that, capital restrictions increase investors’ 
uncertainty and exacerbate risk in the stock market, which depends to a large extent 
on the psychology of investors. 
Furthermore, the findings confirm two interesting facts for the three countries 
under analysis, the co-movement between the returns and volume of transactions for 
both indices in each country and the lack of autocorrelation for the returns of the 
general stock indices and the high capitalization indices. The latter, indicates that the 
stock market does not incorporate previous stock market information, due to the 
capital restrictions implemented.  
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5.1 Limitations and Future Research 
It should be mentioned that the subject of this research is very recent, complex 
and still ongoing. That is why the literature has not shed light yet in many aspects of 
the capital controls phenomenon. It appears, in our research, that the capital controls 
measures do not lead to negative returns on the stock markets as the average returns 
of the indices in all three markets are at similar levels before and after the imposition 
of capital restrictions. The fact that, the time period of the research was one year 
before and one year after the capital controls were imposed (in the case of Cyprus the 
time interval is even smaller; we had to limit our sample for the analysis before the 
capital controls from 250 to 112 observations due to lack of data) greatly diminishes 
the contrasts that occur in shorter terms - we mentioned that there is a negative impact 
on returns right after the announcement and implementation of the capital controls, 
but, overall, we do not observe significant differences in the stock market returns, in 
the time horizon of our research.  
All in all, in order to allow for more detailed conclusions about the investors’ 
response to capital controls; it would be useful in the future to study the long-term 
course of the stock market in a series of time periods with shorter time intervals. In 
this way, it will be possible to study both the direct and the overall impact of the 
different nature of the capital controls imposed. This will not only explain investor 
behaviors and market behavior in such events, but it will also be possible to formulate 
recommendations according to the nature and intensity of the measures, and the 
prevailing market conditions. Finally, in future research, in order to further determine 
the factors of co-movement in Greece, Cyprus and Russia, a Granger-causality test 
should be run for returns and volume. The findings of autocorrelations could be useful 
to analyze the market efficiency with a regression, suggesting how the capital controls 
affect the efficient market hypothesis.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1  
  -1 0 1 -1 0 1 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob<Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor] 
       
1 0.0309 0.0404 .48117 0.4879   
2 0.0348 0.0522 1.0912 0.5795   
3 0.0012 -0.0931 1.0919 0.7790   
4 -0.0537 -0.0867 2.5506 0.6356   
5 -0.0244 . 2.8527 0.7227   
6 -0.1356 . 12.201 0.0576 -  
7 -0.0931 . 16.613 0.0201   
8 -0.0363 . 17.286 0.0273   
9 0.0019 . 17.288 0.0444   
10 0.0609 . 19.191 0.0379   
11 0.0898 . 23.334 0.0159   
12 0.0290 . 23.766 0.0219   
13 -0.0813 . 27.17 0.0118   
14 0.0308 . 27.658 0.0158   
15 -0.0148 . 27.772 0.0230   
16 0.0246 . 28.085 0.0309   
17 -0.0512 . 29.446 0.0306   
18 -0.0487 . 30.68 0.0313   
19 0.0239 . 30.98 0.0406   
20 0.0080 . 31.013 0.0550   
21 0.0613 . 32.984 0.0464   
22 -0.0538 . 34.502 0.0436   
23 -0.0206 . 34.725 0.0554   
24 -0.0243 . 35.036 0.0679   
25 -0.0590 . 36.877 0.0593   
26 0.0052 . 36.892 0.0764   
27 0.0172 . 37.049 0.0942   
28 0.0008 . 37.05 0.1178   
29 -0.0195 . 37.253 0.1399   
30 0.0419 . 38.192 0.1449   
31 -0.0028 . 38.196 0.1750   
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32 0.0625 . 40.293 0.1491   
33 0.0016 . 40.294 0.1788   
34 -0.0489 . 41.58 0.1741   
35 -0.0532 . 43.106 0.1633   
36 -0.0648 . 45.379 0.1359   
37 -0.0092 . 45.425 0.1611   
38 0.0010 . 45.426 0.1902   
39 -0.0295 . 45.901 0.2078   
40 0.0212 . 46.145 0.2332   
.        
 
 
Table 2  
  -1 0 1 -1 0 1 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob<Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor] 
       
1 0.0324 0.0427 .52897 0.4670   
2 0.0260 0.0398 .87098 0.6469   
3 -0.0061 -0.1165 .8897 0.8279   
4 -0.0675 -0.1393 3.1933 0.5260 -   
5 -0.0068 . 3.2169 0.6666   
6 -0.1242 . 11.051 0.0868   
7 -0.1133 . 17.586 0.0140   
8 -0.0249 . 17.901 0.0220   
9 0.0048 . 17.913 0.0362   
10 0.0652 . 20.093 0.0284   
11 0.0951 . 24.733 0.0100   
12 0.0228 . 25 0.0148   
13 -0.1014 . 30.296 0.0043   
14 0.0391 . 31.086 0.0054   
15 -0.0316 . 31.604 0.0073   
16 0.0310 . 32.101 0.0097   
17 -0.0592 . 33.925 0.0086   
18 -0.0555 . 35.527 0.0081   
19 0.0361 . 36.206 0.0100   
20 0.0252 . 36.537 0.0133   
21 0.0836 . 40.197 0.0070   
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22 -0.0404 . 41.056 0.0081   
23 -0.0359 . 41.734 0.0097   
24 -0.0161 . 41.87 0.0133   
25 -0.0601 . 43.778 0.0115   
26 -0.0029 . 43.783 0.0159   
27 0.0089 . 43.825 0.0216   
28 -0.0087 . 43.865 0.0286   
29 -0.0114 . 43.935 0.0372   
30 0.0505 . 45.299 0.0362   
31 0.0104 . 45.357 0.0463   
32 0.0561 . 47.043 0.0420   
33 0.0005 . 47.043 0.0537   
34 -0.0503 . 48.403 0.0520   
35 -0.0542 . 49.991 0.0482   
36 -0.0584 . 51.833 0.0425   
37 -0.0069 . 51.859 0.0533   
38 0.0166 . 52.009 0.0645   
39 -0.0326 . 52.588 0.0718   
40 0.0231 . 52.88 0.0835   
.        
 
 
Table 3  
   -1 0 1 -1 0 1 
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor] 
       
1 0.0485 0.0618 .86491 0.3524   
2 -0.1127 -0.1792 5.5381 0.0627 -   
3 0.1221 0.2667 11.041 0.0115 --   
4 -0.0092 -0.2317 11.073 0.0258 -   
5 0.0088 . 11.101 0.0494   
6 -0.0436 . 11.81 0.0663   
7 -0.0454 . 12.579 0.0831   
8 -0.0181 . 12.701 0.1225   
9 0.0172 . 12.812 0.1713   
10 -0.0189 . 12.947 0.2267   
11 -0.0051 . 12.956 0.2962   
 62 
12 -0.0629 . 14.453 0.2727   
13 0.0372 . 14.979 0.3087   
14 0.1299 . 21.401 0.0918 -  
15 -0.1198 . 26.88 0.0297   
16 0.0085 . 26.907 0.0425   
17 0.0224 . 27.1 0.0566   
18 -0.0483 . 27.998 0.0621   
19 0.0446 . 28.765 0.0698   
20 0.0660 . 30.454 0.0628   
21 -0.0919 . 33.737 0.0387   
22 -0.0461 . 34.566 0.0430   
23 -0.0109 . 34.613 0.0568   
24 -0.0762 . 36.889 0.0449   
25 -0.0801 . 39.409 0.0335   
26 0.0140 . 39.486 0.0438   
27 -0.0196 . 39.638 0.0554   
28 -0.0525 . 40.73 0.0568   
29 0.0122 . 40.789 0.0718   
30 0.0189 . 40.932 0.0880   
31 0.0226 . 41.136 0.1054   
32 0.0211 . 41.314 0.1253   
33 0.0317 . 41.719 0.1420   
34 0.0153 . 41.813 0.1678   
35 -0.0518 . 42.899 0.1686   
36 -0.0466 . 43.781 0.1748   
37 -0.0695 . 45.752 0.1532   
38 0.0157 . 45.852 0.1786   
39 -0.0363 . 46.394 0.1938   
40 -0.0086 . 46.424 0.2246   
.        
 
 
Table 4  
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor] 
       
1 0.1189 0.1450 5.1887 0.0227 -   
2 0.0002 -0.0259 5.1887 0.0747   
 63 
3 0.1245 0.2596 10.91 0.0122 --   
4 -0.0259 -0.1720 11.159 0.0248 -   
5 -0.0166 . 11.261 0.0464   
6 -0.0369 . 11.768 0.0673   
7 -0.0599 . 13.106 0.0696   
8 0.0316 . 13.479 0.0964   
9 0.0432 . 14.179 0.1161   
10 0.0028 . 14.182 0.1648   
11 0.0196 . 14.327 0.2154   
12 -0.0410 . 14.964 0.2434   
13 -0.0055 . 14.976 0.3089   
14 0.0911 . 18.135 0.2007   
15 -0.0902 . 21.238 0.1294   
16 0.0175 . 21.356 0.1652   
17 0.0399 . 21.968 0.1860   
18 -0.0524 . 23.025 0.1896   
19 0.0306 . 23.386 0.2208   
20 0.0256 . 23.639 0.2585   
21 -0.0950 . 27.146 0.1661   
22 -0.0465 . 27.99 0.1760   
23 -0.0377 . 28.544 0.1959   
24 -0.0706 . 30.496 0.1689   
25 -0.0616 . 31.988 0.1584   
26 0.0079 . 32.012 0.1927   
27 -0.0385 . 32.598 0.2107   
28 -0.0286 . 32.923 0.2386   
29 0.0097 . 32.96 0.2793   
30 0.0365 . 33.492 0.3016   
31 0.0314 . 33.886 0.3300   
32 0.0225 . 34.088 0.3675   
33 0.0176 . 34.213 0.4093   
34 -0.0013 . 34.214 0.4575   
35 -0.0599 . 35.666 0.4369   
36 -0.0476 . 36.586 0.4415   
37 -0.0586 . 37.985 0.4243   
38 0.0062 . 38.001 0.4694   
39 -0.0224 . 38.207 0.5059   
40 -0.0074 . 38.229 0.5502   
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.        
 
 
Table 5  
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor] 
        
1 0.0287 0.0384 .41467 0.5196    
2 -0.0082 -0.0190 .44831 0.7992    
3 0.0174 -0.0866 .60179 0.8960    
4 -0.0426 0.0406 1.5187 0.8233    
5 -0.0028 . 1.5228 0.9104    
6 -0.0067 . 1.5453 0.9564    
7 -0.0200 . 1.7487 0.9724    
8 -0.0008 . 1.749 0.9878    
9 -0.0246 . 2.0583 0.9905    
10 0.0159 . 2.1877 0.9947    
11 -0.0641 . 4.2976 0.9604    
12 -0.0900 . 8.4632 0.7480    
13 0.0501 . 9.7552 0.7138    
14 -0.0130 . 9.8431 0.7736    
15 0.0561 . 11.475 0.7183    
16 0.0760 . 14.472 0.5636    
17 -0.0236 . 14.763 0.6126    
18 -0.0165 . 14.905 0.6685    
19 0.0180 . 15.074 0.7179    
20 0.0227 . 15.344 0.7564    
21 0.0562 . 17 0.7111    
22 -0.0159 . 17.133 0.7560    
23 0.0327 . 17.696 0.7737    
24 0.0269 . 18.077 0.7993    
25 -0.1309 . 27.136 0.3491 -   
26 -0.0605 . 29.076 0.3076    
27 -0.0080 . 29.11 0.3556    
28 0.0068 . 29.134 0.4057    
29 0.0405 . 30.01 0.4135    
30 0.0269 . 30.397 0.4455    
31 -0.0420 . 31.342 0.4491    
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32 -0.0037 . 31.349 0.4993    
33 -0.0002 . 31.349 0.5494    
34 0.0288 . 31.797 0.5761    
35 -0.0283 . 32.228 0.6026    
36 0.0603 . 34.194 0.5547    
37 0.0267 . 34.582 0.5830    
38 0.0241 . 34.897 0.6137    
39 0.0238 . 35.204 0.6437    
40 -0.0499 . 36.561 0.6259    
.         
 
 
Table 6  
LAG AC PAC Q Prob>Q [Autocorrelation] [Partial Autocor] 
        
1 0.0281 0.0320 .39774 0.5283    
2 -0.0573 -0.0882 2.0544 0.3580    
3 0.0414 0.0872 2.9204 0.4041    
4 0.0005 -0.0276 2.9205 0.5712    
5 -0.0376 . 3.6389 0.6025    
6 -0.0171 . 3.7883 0.7053    
7 0.0018 . 3.7899 0.8036    
8 0.0065 . 3.8118 0.8737    
9 -0.0234 . 4.0925 0.9052    
10 -0.0811 . 7.4594 0.6815    
11 -0.0002 . 7.4595 0.7607    
12 -0.0355 . 8.1066 0.7767    
13 0.0644 . 10.244 0.6738    
14 0.0427 . 11.186 0.6714    
15 -0.0133 . 11.277 0.7327    
16 -0.0081 . 11.31 0.7899    
17 0.0315 . 11.825 0.8106    
18 -0.0316 . 12.343 0.8290    
19 0.0017 . 12.345 0.8704    
20 0.0037 . 12.352 0.9034    
21 0.0540 . 13.878 0.8748    
22 0.0361 . 14.562 0.8803    
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23 -0.0728 . 17.352 0.7916    
24 -0.0566 . 19.038 0.7499    
25 -0.0091 . 19.082 0.7932    
26 -0.0044 . 19.093 0.8325    
27 -0.0120 . 19.168 0.8638    
28 0.0405 . 20.043 0.8629    
29 0.0508 . 21.416 0.8435    
30 0.0068 . 21.441 0.8736    
31 -0.0112 . 21.508 0.8979    
32 0.0341 . 22.132 0.9038    
33 0.0062 . 22.152 0.9241    
34 0.0031 . 22.157 0.9411    
35 -0.0040 . 22.166 0.9548    
36 0.0036 . 22.173 0.9657    
37 -0.0324 . 22.741 0.9683    
38 -0.0652 . 25.049 0.9473    
39 -0.0018 . 25.051 0.9593    
40 0.0108 . 25.115 0.9682    
.         
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Cointegration  
 
Greece  
 
ASE 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0042707   .0021476    -1.99   0.047    -.0084902   -.0000512
       V_ASE     1.90e-11   1.31e-11     1.45   0.147    -6.68e-12    4.46e-11
                                                                              
       R_ASE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .385300846   499  .000772146           Root MSE      =  .02776
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0022
    Residual    .383673398   498  .000770429           R-squared     =  0.0042
       Model    .001627448     1  .001627448           Prob > F      =  0.1467
                                                       F(  1,   498) =    2.11
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     500
. regress R_ASE V_ASE
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)            -19.975            -3.449            -2.874            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       388
. dfuller newvar, lags(0)
. predict newvar, residuals
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FTSE 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0049686   .0023903    -2.08   0.038    -.0096649   -.0002722
      V_FTSE     2.21e-11   1.50e-11     1.47   0.141    -7.37e-12    5.16e-11
                                                                              
      R_FTSE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .495707748   499  .000993402           Root MSE      =  .03148
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0023
    Residual    .493555838   498  .000991076           R-squared     =  0.0043
       Model     .00215191     1   .00215191           Prob > F      =  0.1412
                                                       F(  1,   498) =    2.17
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     500
. regress R_FTSE V_FTSE
 
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)            -19.783            -3.449            -2.874            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       388
. dfuller newvar, lags(0)
. predict newvar, residuals
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Cyprus  
 
CYSM 
                                                                              
       _cons     -.000797   .0017714    -0.45   0.653    -.0042804    .0026865
      V_CYSM     3.48e-10   3.19e-10     1.09   0.277    -2.80e-10    9.75e-10
                                                                              
      R_CYSM        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .337408152   363  .000929499           Root MSE      =  .03048
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0005
    Residual    .336305952   362  .000929022           R-squared     =  0.0033
       Model      .0011022     1    .0011022           Prob > F      =  0.2768
                                                       F(  1,   362) =    1.19
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     364
. regress R_CYSM V_CYSM
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)            -16.743            -3.458            -2.879            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       277
. dfuller newvar, lags(0)
(136 missing values generated)
. predict newvar, residuals
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FTSE_CY 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0003259   .0017199    -0.19   0.850    -.0037082    .0030563
   V_FTSE_CY     3.97e-10   3.06e-10     1.30   0.195    -2.05e-10    9.99e-10
                                                                              
   R_FTSE_CY        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .314980958   363  .000867716           Root MSE      =  .02943
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0019
    Residual    .313522961   362  .000866086           R-squared     =  0.0046
       Model    .001457997     1  .001457997           Prob > F      =  0.1953
                                                       F(  1,   362) =    1.68
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     364
. regress R_FTSE_CY V_FTSE_CY
 
 
. 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)            -16.138            -3.458            -2.879            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       277
. dfuller newvar, lags(0)
(136 missing values generated)
. predict newvar, residuals
. drop newvar
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Russia  
 
INDEXCF 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0016188   .0017227     0.94   0.348    -.0017659    .0050035
   V_INDEXCF    -3.73e-14   2.37e-14    -1.57   0.116    -8.38e-14    9.24e-15
                                                                              
   R_INDEXCF        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .279396164   499  .000559912           Root MSE      =  .02363
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0030
    Residual    .278012524   498  .000558258           R-squared     =  0.0050
       Model     .00138364     1   .00138364           Prob > F      =  0.1160
                                                       F(  1,   498) =    2.48
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     500
. regress R_INDEXCF  V_INDEXCF
 
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)            -21.698            -3.449            -2.874            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       389
. dfuller newvar, lags(0)
. predict newvar, residuals
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MXR 
. 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0018657   .0016783     1.11   0.267    -.0014317    .0051631
       V_MXR    -6.47e-14   3.31e-14    -1.95   0.051    -1.30e-13    3.42e-16
                                                                              
       R_MXR        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .263111837   497    .0005294           Root MSE      =  .02294
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0056
    Residual    .261101056   496  .000526413           R-squared     =  0.0076
       Model    .002010781     1  .002010781           Prob > F      =  0.0512
                                                       F(  1,   496) =    3.82
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     498
. regress R_MXR  V_MXR
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)            -18.156            -3.449            -2.875            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       387
. dfuller newvar, lags(0)
 
 
 
